Public PoC escapes a Firecracker microVM to root on the host
It chains the critical PwnEscape kernel bug to root on Firecracker 1.16.1 — but only without the jailer. What's exposed, and the patch to ship.

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A no-jailer Firecracker escape, reproduced to host root
PWN Research's Paulos Yibelo published a working guest-to-host PoC: it walks EPT from a guest page into host memory, defeats ASLR on the Firecracker ELF, and hijacks a vCPU thread parked in KVM_RUN to execute code as root — on Firecracker v1.16.1 (x86-64), host kernel 7.0.0-1011-aws. If you run untrusted agent code in microVMs, stop treating the VMM boundary as a hard wall.
The jailer is doing more work than you think
The demo ran Firecracker directly as root with no jailer. Yibelo notes production containment — seccomp, namespaces, privilege drop — materially changes the outcome, so a compromised VMM reaches far less. Action: confirm your sandbox fleet actually launches via the jailer with a tight seccomp profile, not bare firecracker, before you call the blast radius 'contained.'
Patch the kernel under your sandboxes
The chain rides CVE-2026-99999 (PwnEscape), a 9.3-severity Linux networking bug that already leaked ~32 bytes of host memory per packet from inside a guest in production tests. The mainline fix (commit 6785011f8b16) shipped in 6.12.113, 6.18.57, 7.2.11 and the 5.x/6.x LTS lines — but distros backport without bumping the version, so check your vendor advisory, not just uname -r.